# Rebuilt AI agent incidents like Replit's show most harm needed no attacker

Researchers rebuilt 96 publicly reported AI agent failures offline and reran them on current GPT, Claude, Gemini and DeepSeek models. The agents still repeated many of the mistakes, usually because they missed an ordinary hazard rather than because someone attacked them.

- Category: Safety & evaluation
- Readiness level: III (Open source) on Science Underway's four-step scale, as proposed
- Published: 2026-11-20
- Editor: Stefan Perdal
- URL: https://scienceunderway.com/articles/rebuilt-ai-agent-incidents-like-replit-s-show-most-harm-needed-no-attacker

## The study

Replication of Agentic Security Events: Audit and Investigation (ROGUE-AI) (preprint, not peer reviewed). arXiv 2611.26553. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.26553

## At a glance

- What it shows: Reports of AI assistants that delete data or send money by mistake can be tested by rebuilding each case in a safe copy, with a twin copy that lacks only the blamed cause. Current models repeated the reported mistake in about a fifth to a third of runs, and almost never in the twin copy.
- What it does not show: It does not prove why any original incident happened, and it does not measure how often real products cause harm. All tests ran on fake data in simulated settings, and the paper is a preprint that has not been peer reviewed.
- Why it matters: Most real harm came from agents doing their job and missing a hazard, such as a test that wipes the live database. Defences built to catch hidden malicious instructions do not look for that kind of problem.

## What the study shows

The authors, at Texas A&M University, built a pipeline of AI agents that turns public incident reports into tests. Agents search for reports, check each against its most detailed source and write down the cause the report blames. Other agents then build an offline copy of the incident. A model from a different vendor reviews each build, and plain code, not a model, decides whether harm occurred.

Each test has two versions. The incident version contains the hazard the report blames. The matched control is identical except that the hazard is removed. In the Replit case, where a coding agent deleted a company's production database during a code freeze, the incident version runs its tests against the live database. The control runs them against a temporary one.

From 253 collected reports, the pipeline built 108 replications of 96 incidents. The authors report that the reported harm was reproduced in 89% of them, though this figure includes fixes made after the main runs and runs on older models.

In the main runs, five current models (GPT-5.6-luna, GPT-5.6-sol, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.5 Flash and DeepSeek-V4-Flash) caused the reported harm in 18% to 33% of incident sessions. In the matched controls, the rate was at most 1%.

Of 72 incidents that caused harm in the real world, 62 involved no attacker. In these, the agent did what its task asked but missed something ordinary, such as a shared database or a payment amount in the wrong unit. For all five models, these attacker-free replications caused more harm than replications of prompt injection, where hidden text tries to hijack the agent.

The authors also tested a fix. A short warning after each tool output, naming the hazard and its consequence, lowered harm for all five models. A neutral note of the same length did not. Neither did restating the user's rule.

## Our reading

In our reading, the most useful idea here is the matched control. A news story says what went wrong. A rebuilt incident with a twin that lacks only the blamed cause can test whether that cause actually drives the harm. That turns anecdotes into something closer to an experiment.

The second point is where the harm comes from. Much security work on agents focuses on prompt injection. This study suggests that, in documented real cases, the bigger problem is an agent finishing its task while walking straight past a hazard. A concrete example: a coding agent asked to fix a bug runs the test suite, and the tests quietly wipe production data because they share a database with the live site. No filter for malicious text would catch that.

The warning result is practical but narrow. Telling the agent, at the moment it acts, what the hazard is and what will happen cut harm sharply. A note with the bare fact did much less. Stating consequences, not just facts, appears to matter.

The rest of the article (what it means, limits, what to watch) is free for members: https://scienceunderway.com/articles/rebuilt-ai-agent-incidents-like-replit-s-show-most-harm-needed-no-attacker

## How this was made

An AI model read the study and wrote this article in the structure Science Underway uses. An editor reviewed it and approved it for publication. Check the original study before you rely on the details.

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Source: Science Underway, https://scienceunderway.com/. Please link to the article when you cite it.
