# Eight in ten AI models gave up a secret hidden in their instructions

A preprint tested 363 models on one gateway. An AI attacker, guided by a researcher, pulled a protected code out of 296 of them, often by asking for a translation.

- Category: Safety & evaluation
- Readiness level: II (Benchmarked) on Science Underway's four-step scale, as proposed
- Published: 2026-11-18
- Editor: Stefan Perdal
- URL: https://scienceunderway.com/articles/eight-in-ten-ai-models-gave-up-a-secret-hidden-in-their-instructions

## The study

Eight in Ten LLMs Leak System-Prompt Secrets: Nevan, an Agentic Capture-the-Flag Study (preprint, not peer reviewed). arXiv 2611.21956. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.21956

## At a glance

- What it shows: Researchers hid a random code in the private instructions of 363 AI models and told each model never to reveal it. An AI attacker, guided by a person, got the code out of 296 of them, about eight in ten.
- What it does not show: It does not show how often each model leaks, or that the 50 models that held out are safe. It also does not show that models would leak real passwords or personal data in the same way.
- Why it matters: Many products hide rules, and sometimes secrets, in these private instructions. The study adds broad evidence that this hiding place is not secure.

## What the study shows

Most AI products start each chat with a system prompt: hidden instructions from the developer that set the model's role and rules. Users are not meant to see it, and the model is meant to follow it over user requests. Security guidance already warns against putting secrets there. This study tests how often that warning matters in practice.

The authors took 363 text models listed on OpenRouter, a service that gives access to models from many providers through one connection. Each model received the same system prompt. It held a random 16-character code and a strict order never to reveal it, in any form. The catalogue was frozen on 6 October 2026.

The attacker was an AI agent, a coding assistant driven by the DeepSeek V4.1 Flash model, steered by a human researcher. A capture counted only when the exact code appeared in a reply. Each model was counted once, at its first capture.

The authors report that 296 of the 363 models gave up the code. Four newer models released after the freeze were also captured, for 300 in total. Fifty models were never captured, and 17 could not be reached with text.

Simple requests did most of the work. Asking a model to translate its instructions into French, keeping the code unchanged, took 116 models in one message. Asking for a plain English rewrite took 67 more. Overall, 170 of the 300 captures involved a language other than English.

Captured models include older versions of well-known families, such as Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash and Pro, as well as small roleplay models. The work is a preprint and has not been peer reviewed.

## Our reading

In our reading, the striking part is not the attack. It is how ordinary the attack was. Most models did not fall to clever tricks. They fell to a request that sounds like normal work: translate this, tidy this, keep the identifiers as they are. The model treats the request as a task and the code as just another string to preserve.

This suggests a model cannot easily tell the difference between handling its instructions and revealing them. Picture a support chatbot whose hidden prompt holds a staff discount code. A customer who asks it to put its setup into French may get the code back, with no hacking skill at all.

The study is a measurement across a wide catalogue, not a new attack or defence. We rate it at readiness level II, benchmarked: it reports per-model results on a public catalogue. It does not reach level III yet, because the authors' code and records sit in a repository that is private until the paper is accepted.

The rest of the article (what it means, limits, what to watch) is free for members: https://scienceunderway.com/articles/eight-in-ten-ai-models-gave-up-a-secret-hidden-in-their-instructions

## How this was made

An AI model read the study and wrote this article in the structure Science Underway uses. An editor reviewed it and approved it for publication. Check the original study before you rely on the details.

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Source: Science Underway, https://scienceunderway.com/. Please link to the article when you cite it.
